Wednesday, August 3, 2011

One Would Think a Biosafety Laboratory Would Be Free of Deficiencies

After 2001, the president and the government issued the National Homeland Security Act and with it came grants in the millions of dollars for BSL 4 Laboratories. There are hundreds of BSL 3 labs in the United States but as of 2001 there were only three BSL 4 Labs. Scientists all over the nation began vying for a coveted grant in order to build a new BSL 4 Lab. Today, in 2011, there are an additional three BSL 4 Laboratories. These new labs are in Hamilton, Montana, University of Texas in Galveston, Texas and the Boston Medical Center in Boston, Massachusetts. When these labs were brand new an article in "The Scientist Magazine" reported on its state of the art equipment and how self contained they were, how safe it is and the near zero possibility of a break due to the protective seals and security.

In 2004, the federal government began a survey of labs that received federally funded money. It was called "The Sunshine Project" and included over 400 members, who formed the IBC (Institutional Biosafety Committee), and the results of their surveys were not reassuring. Scientists may feel certain that dangerous organisms such as Ebola are not going to leave the facility; however, there was not enough proof that quality assurance methods were being performed inside the laboratories! Dangerous experiments were conducted without proper safety measures in place, no reviews of work that was being performed, no direct supervision on experiments, no periodic inspections of facilities to assure all equipment had remained in good working order.

The results of "The Sunshine Project" are well documented and each lab is handling their own list of measures that must be maintained for everyone's safety. The NIH has written and posted a safety fact sheet which gives specific instructions on different types of PPE (Protective Personal Equipment) and sharps handling for a BSL 2 Lab but there do not appear any standarized protocols across the board for each type of BSL Lab. Furthermore, on further scrutiny of the protocols for BSL lab but particularly BSL 3 and 4, there appear to be areas that could be improved upon.

First, because there are so many gifted minds working in the same building, it could become difficult for someone to attempt to supervise safety issues. Especially if that person is not another scientist. On the other hand, it may well take an outsider who knows only safety in the Healthcare setting to handle safety issues inside a BSL Lab. The right person may be able to encourage the scientists to develop good safety habits. Even the ones in charge of BSL 4 Labs agreed that training and then supervision of personnel needs to be improved as the language in the training manuals is too ambiguous.

The manual uses words such as "should" "must" or "need to" when speaking of specific training for work inside a BSL 4 Lab but that is not specific. Language such as this opens the way for a wide range of intreptation and with that, the risk for an error or a dangerous event escalates. Dr James W. Le Duc from Homeland Security wrote about the need to standarize the language in all training manuals for each type of BSL across the nation in "The Scientist magazine" in 2008. The safety fact sheet for a BSL 2 Lab mentioned in the above paragraph was dated 2009.
Even with a safety plan in place and all the instruction, training and records done; will that make these high-risk labs safe? Absolutely not, but it may make them safer for all employees. By instituting guidelines and holding all employees accountable, the risk of a dangerous, potentially fatal mistake is sharply reduced.

barbara bethard
References:
http://www.drs.illinois.edu/bss/factsheets/bsl2.aspx?tbID=fs
http://www.semp.us/publications/biot_reader.php?BiotID=555
http://classic.the-scientist.com/article/display/14403/
http://www.sunshine-project.org/biodefense/bb.html#11
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BSL-3#Biosafety_level_3

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